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EXPORTING AND THE SAGA FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
OF BRAZILIAN INDUSTRY - 1992 
Renato Baumann1 
I - Introduction 
The Brazilian economy has - for a whole decade - presented 
what have probably been its worst economic indicators ever; by the 
end of the 1980s, the difficulties were even sharper. Inflation had 
mounted to 12-month rates as high as 3000% by mid-1990, and 
averaged more than 800% in the following two years, whereas real 
per capita GDP fell 15% between 1988 and 1992. 
Meanwhile, exports grew at a very rapid pace, with yearly 
growth rates reaching nearly 5% between 1980 and 1992, thanks 
mainly to industrial products, exports of which increased until 
they accounted for 74% of total exports by 1992. 
These two sets of figures have led some analysts to see the 
dynamism of exports as an important source of growth for the 
industrial sector that partially compensates for the depressed 
domestic market. According to such views, industrial exports have 
become important not only as a source of foreign exchange, as most 
previous analyses of the Brazilian experience have suggested, 
taking into account, among other things, the relative 
insignificance of external sales for total domestic production. By 
disaggregating the sources of growth, one finds that the external 
market has also become more important as a source of demand for 
some industrial sectors. 
Furthermore, the experience of 1986 - when several exporters 
diverted products from the external market to meet the overheated 
domestic demand and very soon found that the cost of losing foreign 
contracts proved to be too high - has led to expectations that the 
increasing involvement in export activity is likely to become more 
permanent than before. 
At the same time, the period since 1987 has witnessed an 
unprecedented movement towards the opening of the Brazilian economy 
to imports, which has intensified since 1990. 
The precondition for domestic producers to operate 
successfully in a more open context is to improve competitiveness 
so as to survive the inflow of competing imports and maintain (or 
1UN/ECLAC. The opinions expressed herein are those of the 
author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
institutions with which he is affiliated. 
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increase) their share of international markets. Improved 
competitiveness has thus become an explicit target for private 
producers and policy makers in Brazil as never before. 
The present study draws on the primary results of a large 
research project undertaken jointly by the Instituto de Economia -
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, the Universidade de 
Campinas and the Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology on 
the main features of Brazilian industry with regard to its 
competitiveness. The research sought to portray the basic steps 
undertaken recently by Brazilian industrial firms in pursuing 
competitiveness, their views concerning the main trends and their 
plans for future action in this regard. A total of 1,500 
questionnaires were sent to firms all over the country, and firms 
were selected on the basis of their contribution to sectoral 
production, according to the 1985 census. 
The results reported here represent a partial processing of 
data from 350 firms that answered the questionnaire. It was assumed 
that in order to evaluate the peculiarities of the export sector, 
the sample of firms should be designed in a way that allows for 
isolating the effects of exports (i.e., sectoral comparability of 
exporters and non-exporters), firm size sectoral specificities. A 
sub-sample of 199 firms in 11 sectors2 was then identified, and 
forms the basis for the present analysis. 
This study is part of a series of papers dealing with a wide 
range of subjects directly and indirectly related to the basic 
issue of the competitiveness of Brazilian industry3. More 
specifically, the present paper seeks to: a) identify the basic 
action undertaken in the last five years with regard to improving 
competitiveness, as reflected in the answers to the questionnaire, 
and b) try to relate whatever differences might be found in the 
behaviour of the firms to the differences in their involvement in 
export activity. 
This study should be seen as only a first approach to the 
subject, since time constraints did not allow it to: a) take into 
account all the information4 available from the research and b) 
2Steel products; power generating machinery; automobile 
industry; cotton textiles; pulp; paper; cement; producers of 
television, radio and sound receivers; fertilizers; furniture; and 
apparel and clothing. 
3A parallel study dealing with broad issues based on the same 
primary data is Bielschowsky (1993). 
4A number of aspects, such as a detailed account of manpower 
training, the entrepreneurs' view of the limitations imposed by the 
physical and technological infrastructure and others, have not been 
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process the data so as to isolate the specific effects due to firm 
size, sectoral specificities and involvement in export activity. 
Furthermore, this paper should not be expected to include here 
a comprehensive testing of the effects stemming from involvement in 
the external market. That would require further work, taking into 
consideration the characteristics of the period of analysis •- above 
all the domestic recession and exchange-rate overvaluation that 
have affected the export sector - and controlling for firm size and 
sectoral specificities, among other attributes. 
Instead, the aim of this first approximation is to depict 
efforts made by the firms surveyed in order to foster 
competitiveness, and to try to identify indications that 
involvement in export activity might lead to a differentiated 
approach. As a by-product, it attempts to determine whether these 
sample results confirm in broad terms some specific procedures that 
characterize exporting firms elsewhere. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section 
presents a very brief overview of some positive effects that might 
be expected from increased involvement in exporting, as a reference 
for a comparative evaluation of the results obtained. The third 
section presents a description of the sample of firms and the basic 
structure of the questionnaire. The fourth section summarizes the 
basic findings and how they compare to previous evidence, and the 
main conclusions and some policy implications are presented in the 
last section. 
II- & brief account of the positive effects to be expected from 
exporting 
Theory - as well as empirical evidence from the experience of 
several countries - would lead one to expect a positive correlation 
between exporting and the improvement of competitiveness. Not only 
is maintaining a certain level of competitiveness a precondition 
for successful export performance. There is a virtuous circle 
linking more exports to more efficient production processes, to 
better identification of international market opportunities, closer 
contact with technical progress, and so on, all of which feeds back 
into improving the conditions for exporting more and in a more 
sustained way. 
At the level of firms, it is often found that firms in 
developing countries have difficulties in collecting rents accruing 
from new technologies and thus spend relatively limited resources 
considered here. 
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on basic, innovative research and development (R&D) activities; 
instead, they orient their research activities towards adapting 
foreign technologies. 
But causality is likely to work in both directions. Exports 
increase the size of the market and might thus encourage a return 
to innovative activities. Also, the external market might impose 
more rigorous conditions on exporters, thus reinforcing the demand 
for these technological change activities. 
As far as the type of technological improvement activities is 
concerned, it might therefore be expected that the greater the 
degree of involvement of a given firm in export activity, the more 
likely it is to adopt innovations in cost-cutting, quality 
improvement and product differentiation. 
As far as the way of acquiring technology is concerned, the 
classification adopted by Kirim (1990) for modes of transfer of 
knowledge can be used. These transfers might take place according 
to "formal" (market-mediated) contracts (direct investment, 
licensing, management contracts, turnkey projects), or they might 
be absorbed via "informal" (non-market) mechanisms such as learning 
by exporting, imitation, keeping up with technical literature, 
visiting trade fairs, scientific exchange and others. 
It is not the purpose of this study to go into an extensive 
survey of the related literature. Instead, it will merely review 
some pieces of evidence relative to a developing country which 
recently moved towards a more liberal trade orientation 
information on Turkey provides a basis for comparison - and a few 
indicators already available for Brazil. 
The results reported in Kirim (1990) for 659 firms in 
1987-1988 will be used as a reference for the Turkish experience. 
Kirim finds no discernible difference between exportes and 
domestic-market-oriented firms in terms of their relative R&D 
spending. Export orientation seemed to influence the direction, of 
technological research efforts. The three most important 
technological change activities for exporters were, in order of 
importance: 1) cost reduction; 2) capacity stretching (expanding 
the physical yield of existing plants and equipment without making 
major investments in new capital equipment); and 3) quality 
improvement. 
For non-exporters, the ranking was somewhat different, with 
quality improvement in first place, followed by cost reduction and 
(lastly) capacity stretching. 
Since competing with imports primarily requires product 
quality, and only to a lesser extent price differentials, the 
technological activity of domestic-market-oriented firms would be 
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expected to focus more on product differentiation and less on cost-
reducing technological research activities. Exporting firms, on the 
other hand, could be expected to undertake systematic activities 
involving cost-reducing, quality-improving and product-developing 
technological change. 
There also seem to be differences between exporters and non-
exporters, in the way these technological changes take place. 
Exporting firms not only were involved in more cost-reducing 
technological activities than domestic-market-oriented firms, but 
also carried out these activities more systematically. 
Furthermore, both exporting and domestic-market-oriented firms 
usually acquired their technologies through formal, non-equity 
modes of technology acquisition only in those cases where the 
products or technologies were new to them. Domestic-market-oriented 
firms relied predominantly on domestic and informal sources for 
acquiring technologies, while exporting firms relied on market-
mediated transfer mechanisms. The main reason seems to be that "in 
activities that are new to the country and to the industry the 
easiest way to gain access to the technologies is by entering into 
a formal agreement with a foreign supplier; in other areas where 
domestic firms have been established for some time, it was always 
preferable to obtain the incremental knowledge without actually 
paying for it"(p.1354). 
There is apparently no corresponding processed information of 
this kind on Brazil. However, at least three sets of evidence 
dealing with specific characteristics of exporting firms are 
available that provide a background for a comparative evaluation of 
the results obtained in the present enquiry. 
First, Braga (1990) reports on data for 4,342 establishments 
in 13 industrial sectors for 1981. 
He finds - as Kirim did in Turkey - that the probability of 
rationalizing the production process through product quality 
control methods, control of raw materials and changes in the layout 
of the production plant increases with foreign ownership, 
technology imports, exports and size. The probability of using 
quality control is also positively affected by product 
diversification. Furthermore, it was found that not only does 
involvement with exports have an intense impact on all the 
technological activities considered, but also that firms that 
export are much more likely to be involved in technological 
activity than non-exporting firms. 
The export/sales ratio, size and foreign capital ownership 
also increase the probability that a given firm will develop new 
products and create a manpower training programme. 
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Willmore (1992) reports on the results for 17,053 Brazilian 
manufacturing firms in 1980. 
He finds, first, a negative relation between R&D and 
exporting. The existence of a researach and development programme 
appears to have no significant effect on the probability that a 
firm will engage in export or import activities. The causality 
seems to be in the opposite direction, since Braga/Willmore (1991) 
found that exporting increases the probability that a Brazilian 
firm will engage in R&D. 
Exporters tend to be much more concerned about advertising. 
Firms producing highly advertised, hence differentiated, goods are 
more likely than others to participate in international trade. 
Also, exporting firms depend more heavily on imports than domestic-
market-oriented firms. 
Finally, some complementary evidence was obtained by Willmore, 
and published as CEPAL (1985), from data on 12,435 firms in 1978. 
It showed that firm size was the most important factor 
affecting both the probability that a firm will export and its 
subsequent export performance. As far as the competitive attributes 
being considered above are concerned, it was found that advertising 
expenditures and licence agreements were very strongly and 
positively correlated with both the probability of exporting and 
export performance, once again very much in line with the results 
reported for Turkey. 
Ill - The sample 
The analysis is based on data for 199 firms in 11 industrial 
sectors. In 1992, these firms exported a total of US$ 6.2 billion, 
or 23% of total Brazilian exports of industrialized products in 
that year. 
In order to evaluate the role of involvement in exporting, the 
primary data were processed by grouping the respondent firms 
according to their export/total sales ratios, in five groups 
arbitrarily defined as: 
i) non-exporters (firms with an X/Y ratio of up to 5%) ; 
ii) firms with an X/Y ratio of 6% to 10%; 
iii) firms with an X/Y ratio of 11% to 30%; 
iv) firms with an X/Y ratio of 30% and 50% and 
v) firms with an X/Y ratio of over 50%. 
The sample is described according to the number of firms in 











0 to 5 54.2 0.93 0.37 
6 to 10 8.4 0.83 1.26 
11 to 30 22.3 34.25 30.38 
31 to 50 9.5 35.16 43 .16 
Over 50 5.6 28 . 83 24 . 83 
Total 100.0 100.00 100.00 
More than half of the firms have a very low (less than 5%) 
export coefficient, and are thus considered non-exporters, or 
domestic-market-oriented firms. The second notable point revealed 
by these figures is that the group of firms with export 
coefficients between 30% and 50% presented the most impressive 
performance in terms of the external market, significantly 
increasing their share in total sample exports between the two 
periods considered here. 
Most (72%) of these firms are part of economic groups, a 
characteristic common to all five sets of firms. In all but the 
last group, about half (48%) of the firms are multiproducers (i.e., 
produce several items) and (47%) have several producing units 
(multiplant). 
IV - Basic results 
a . Recent adjustment 
The analysis of these data calls for some preliminary remarks 
about the year they were collected (1992) . It is known from 
previous research that most of the production sector -manufacturing 
in particular - in Brazil was by that time undergoing a significant 
change, after some traumatic experiences since 1990, when liquidity 
was drastically reduced by government policies, national output 
declined, domestic interest rates went up very markedly, inflation 
remained at monthly levels of around 2 5% and an open trade policy 
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pushed domestic producers into an unprecedented exposure to 
competition from imports. It is therefore expected that these data 
reflect the firms' efforts to adapt as much as the basic 
differences between exporters and non-exporters. 
Second, the questionnaire was designed to identify the basic 
features of the production sector insofar as measures to improve 
competitiveness are concerned. Hence, the questions were not 
totally tailor-made to deal with the specific subject of export 
activity. The analysis from the viewpoint of involvement with the 
external market is therefore a by-product, even though a great deal 
of information - unprecedented in several respects - is available 
from the processed data. 
Keeping these two points in mind, it is interesting to note 
that most (59%) of the firms classified as non-exporters or 
domestic-market-oriented (DMOs) - those with an export/sales 
coefficient of less than 5% had total sales worth less than US$ 20 
million in 1987-1989, while those firms with export/sales ratios of 
over 30% recorded sales worth over US$ 120 million that year, 
indicating a positive correlation between size and export/sales 
ratios in the sample. 
In 1992 the correlation between the X/Y ratio and total sales 
remained positive, but there are clear indications that the 
exporters were less vulnerable to the domestic recession: among the 
DMO firms, 70% had sales below US$ 20 million (compared to 59% in 
1987-1989), whereas for exporters the impact is inversely 
proportional to the export/sales ratio, as shown by the following 
indicators: 
X/Y (%) % of firms with sales over US$ 120 million 
1987-1989 (average) 1992 
10 to 30 44 33 
31 to 50 64 57 
Over 50 62 62 
This would indicate that - as expected - the external market 
has acted as a "cushion", softening the negative impact of domestic 
recession on these firms in direct proportion to their involvement 
in exports. 
As a confirmation of the importance of the external market as 
a buffer against domestic recession, one could add that the 
proportion of firms with export/sales ratios of 10% to 30% that had 
total exports worth at least US$ 12 million increased from 58% in 
1987-1989 to 74% in 1992, whereas for those firms with export/sales 
ratios of over 30%, that proportion remained close to 90% in both 
periods. 
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The number of employees per firm shows a distribution similar 
to that of total sales: 63% of DMO firms had up to 500 workers in 
1987-1989, while 25% to 36% of the firms with export/sales ratios 
of over 10% had more than 3,000 workers. 
In 1992 there was a clear adjustment process, with significant 
reductions in jobs. Among non-exporters, the proportion of firms 
with up to 500 employees increased to 76%, whereas among exporters 
with export/sales ratios of over 10%, the proportion of firms with 
over 3,000 workers fell to between 13% and 29%. 
This reduction in jobs was accompanied by a corresponding 
change in the decision-making process within the firms, as 
reflected in the number of hierarchical levels. In 1987-1989, half 
of the non-exporters had up to five decision-making levels5, and 
this proportion increased to 67% in 1992. The same occurred in the 
several groups of exporters, in increasing proportion with their 
export/sales ratio, as shown below: 
X/Y ratio % of firms with up to 5 hierachical lLevels 
1987-1989 1992 
(average) 
6 to 10 67 75 
11 to 30 46 60 
31 to 50 15 46 
Over 50 12 40 
It follows from the previous paragraphs that one set of 
differences between exporters and DMO firms stem from their 
capacity to cope with domestic recession and the intensity of their 
adjustment in the use of production factors. 
However, owing either to the feeling that the worst recessive 
period is over, or to hopes of improved competitiveness as a result 
of the adjustment process, more than half of the firms in every 
group - regardless of their export/sales ratio - expected higher 
profits in 1993-1995 than in 1992, and in 1996-1998 in comparison 
to 1993-1995. 
It is worth noting that improved competitiveness is not 
necessarily related to more imports. Data show that 60% or more of 
non-exporters did not import either capital goods or inputs in 
5Firms were asked whether they had up to three decision-making 
levels, four or five levels, six or seven levels, or over seven 
levels. In 1987-1989 21% of the firms with X/Y ratios of 10% to 30% 
and 31% of firms with X/Y ratios of 30% to 50% had more than seven 
levels. In 1992 those proportions fell to 4% and 15%, respectively. 
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1987-1989 or in 19926. Exporting firms are apparently more 
dependent or imports: more than 25% of the firms with an 
export/sales ratio of over 10% imported inputs worth more than 
US$ 10 million in both 1987-1989 and 1992. 
This is consistent with the results obtained by Willmore 
(1992), as reported in section II: there is a greater propensity to 
import in exporting firms as compared to DMO firms. 
Another basic characteristic of the exporting firms in this 
sample has to do with the market of destination for their exports. 
There seem to be some differences in the markets of destination, 
and these differences appear to be linked to the export/sales 
ratio, and hence to the size of the firms. In the smallest group of 
exporters (firms with export/sales ratios of 6% to 10%), 75% of the 
firms made sales to MERCOSUR in 1992, 42% to "other countries of 
Latin America" and 50% to the United States and EEC. Among those 
firms with export/sales ratios of over 50%, 87% export to the 
United States, 62% to the EEC and only 12% to MERCOSUR. 
It seems, therefore, that all firms export to the United 
States and the EEC, but only a limited number of them - and not the 
largest ones - explore the regional market7. Needless to say, this 
generic conclusion must be qualified by information at the sectoral 
level. 
When asked how they channelled their sales, it turned out that 
by and large all the firms said they used mostly their own sales 
structures. It is certainly remarkable that only medium exporters 
6However, that proportion was higher (61%) in 1987-1989 than 
in 1992 (56%) for inputs, indicating that even in this group there 
was some increase in the consumption of imported inputs. 
7The relative importance of MERCOSUR merits some additional 
consideration. The percentage of firms in each group that said it 
was important is as follows: 
X/Y 0-5 6-10 11-30 30-50 Over 50 
(%) 27.5 75.0 42.9 30.8 12.5 
Although the Southern Cone market is considered important for 
most firms in the 6% - 10%, one must take into account the 
relatively high proportions indicated by the firms in other groups. 
For those firms with X/Y ratios of 0% to 5%, this is the market 
with the highest indicators. For the two groups of firms with X/Y 
ratios of 11% to 50%, the percentages are significant, although 
smaller than the corresponding indicators for the United 
States/Canada. Note, however, that the above-mentioned groups 
comprise the bulk of the sample exports. 
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(firms with export/sales ratios of 10% to 50%) referred to the use 
of trading companies and licensed firms, when one would have 
expected the smaller exporters to be the main customers of those 
intermediaries. 
In sum, the evidence reviewed thus far indicates an overall 
trend towards adjusting the number of jobs and the hierarchical 
structure in each firm, and suggests the existence of basic 
differences between exporters and non-exporters with regard to 
their capacity to resist the domestic recession and their 
propensity to import. Also, there are differences among exporters 
with regard to the market of destination of their external sales 
and the way they channel their exports. 
Table 1 summarizes the main indicators in 1992 in comparison 
to 1987-1989. 
Table 1 - Sample indicators by groups of firms 
X/Y Total sales Export Input imports/ Employment/sales 
ratio variation variation sales (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 1987-89 1992 1987-89 1992 
— . . . (average) (average) 
1987-1989/1992 
0 to 5 -4.9 -48.6 9.3 9.5 1.1 0.9 
6 to 10 -2.2 96.4 3.6 8.1 1.6 1.3 
11 to 30 -7.1 9.3 4.8 5.2 0.8 0.7 
31 to 50 5.6 44.3 5.5 5.6 0.6 0.5 
Over 50 8.4 9.0 8.1 9.6 0.4 0.4 
Source: See text. 
A comparison of the first two columns of table 1 shows that in 
all groups of exporters, external sales increased more than total 
sales between the two periods. Also, growth in total sales was 
sharper for those groups of firms involved in some export activity. 
Export performance was particularly intense among firms with 
export/sales ratios of 6% to 10% and 31% to 50%. Although these 
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results must be qualified by sectoral information,8 they suggest 
that on the whole, some exporting was better than no exporting, 
although it is not clear whether more exports are better than fewer 
exports. That is, one cannot conclude - from these data - that 
increasing the export/sales ratio above a certain level is in 
itself an assurance of better overall sales performance. In other 
words, it seems more reasonable to infer that exports worked as a 
buffer against domestic recession than that this period was one of 
export-led growth. 
Table 1 also shows that, in general, all groups of firms 
increased their imported component; however, because the variation 
in the import/sales ratio was more intense among small exporters 
(those firms with export/sales ratios of 6% to 10%) and among the 
largest exporters (firms with export/sales ratios of over 50%) , 
there does not seem to be a linear relation between the 
export/sales ratio and the import/sales ratio. 
Finally, the last two columns of table 1 confirm the overall 
reduction in the number of jobs in all groups of firms. Once again, 
however, this is not a major characteristic linked to the 
export/sales ratio: suffice it to say that among the largest 
exporters, the employment/sales ratio remained the same in the two 
periods. 
What these indicators imply at is that there actually are 
differences between exporters and DM0 firms, but also that the 
adjustment process they reflect is apparently more a result of 
strategies to improve or consolidate the firms' competitive 
position in the domestic market than of strategies for penetrating 
the external market. This should become even more clear in the 
following discussions of market strategies, productive performance 
and managerial, technological and productive capability. 
b. Market strategies 
Firms were asked whether they intended to explore specific 
market segments or several diversified ones, and which would be the 
main tool in their strategies with regard to the domestic and the 
external markets. 
It is remarkable that between 52% and 63% of the firms in 
almost all groups revealed an interest in exploring specific market 
segments. This seems to indicate a wide spread concern with 
competitiveness via specialization. Only among those firms 
exporting more than half of their output was that proportion a bit 
8Export price variations might help explain some of these 
results. 
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smaller (38%) and similar to the proportion of answers indicating 
all market segments. 
This view that specialization leads to competitiveness is 
revealed even more clearly by the information related specifically 
to the competitive strategies of the firms. 
Table 2 summarizes information on product strategy and 
administration of production, showing - for each group of firms -
the percentage of firms that gave affirmative answers. 
According to table 2, firms target specific market segments ; 
they are also (especially non-exporters) concerned about brand-name 
identification and specific clients' requirements. Also, a number 
of exporters of all sizes are concerned about providing technical 
assistance for their domestic sales, as well as improving the 
technical specificity of their products. 
Technical specificity of products is also an attribute 
strongly considered for exports; the higher the export/sales ratio 
of the firms, the more importance it is given. Coupled with the 
importance given to brand-name identification and delivery time, 
this would seem consistent with the previous indications of 
strategies for targeting specific market segments. 
Table 2 - Competitive strategies of firms 
(Product and production administration) 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 
(% of firms) (*) 
31-50 50-100 
Product strategy 
Domestic market: 100 
Brand-name 
identification 45 33 n.s. n.s. 38 
Efficiency of 
technical assistance n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 38 
technical specificity 
of product n.s. 33 38 38 38 
Specific clients' 
requirements 38 33 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
External market: 100 
Low price n.s. 50 46 n.s. n.s. 
Brand-name 
identification n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 38 
Delivery time n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 38 
Technical specificity 
of product n.s. 33 36 77 75 
Production flow 
administration: 176 
Reduce inventories 50 80 50 53 n.s. 
Improve raw 
materials utilization 36 47 45 60 70 
Reduce emission 
of pollutants n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 50 
Reduce jobs n.s. 33 38 n.s. n.s. 
Reduce bottlenecks 
in production n.s. n.s. 35 47 n.s. 
Production process: 107 
Increase standardization n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 60 
Increase flexibility 65 92 65 79 40 
Main productive unit: 171 
Outsourcing basic services 40 47 67 73 90 
Specialize 
product line n.s. 47 47 n.s. n.s. 
Renew 
product line 59 60 61 73 50 
Source: See text. N.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(*) Firms were asked to indicate each attribute as 'important* or "very 
important*, and could indicate up to two attributes. Figures show the 
percentage of firms in each case. 
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It is also worth noting that low price is an attribute not 
considered for sales in the external market, and only those firms 
with low export/sales ratios seem to take it into account. This 
seems consistent with the assumption that Brazilian exporters are 
"price-takers"; that is, too small to influence international price 
levels. 
Figures referring to production flows also reveal some clear 
trends. By and large, firms are trying to reduce their inventories. 
Note that this is true of all those dependent on the domestic 
market for most of their operations, and one reason is probably the 
cost of keeping inventories in a recessive inflationary 
environment. This might also explain why the largest exporters do 
not consider this item in a significant magnitude9. 
There is also a universal concern about improving the 
utilization of raw materials, in increasing proportion to 
involvement in exporting. This is due not only to improved 
competitiveness; for the largest exporters there is also a parallel 
preoccupation with the emission of pollutants, a probable 
consequence of barriers imposed by importing countries10. 
It was shown in previous paragraphs that the adjustment in 
recent years comprised a significant reduction in jobs. According 
to table 2, it appears that no further reduction of significant 
magnitude is to be expected; only some groups of firms indicate an 
intention to reduce jobs and bottlenecks in production. 
Figures at the end of table 2 confirm that the firms aim at 
increasing the flexibility of production processes, outsourcing 
basic services in direct proportion to their export/sales ratios 
and renewing their product line. Once again, this seems consistent 
with the previous indications of a quest for competitiveness based 
on specific market segments and more efficient and flexible 
production processes. 
There are also some differences between exporters and non-
exporters with regard to their approach to other firms, as shown in 
table 3. 
9Note that this approach differs from that previously reported 
for the Turkish firms. 
10This is confirmed by the indications - to be discussed later 
in the text - that non-tariff barriers, have a negative impact on 
the largest exporters. 
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Table 3 - Competitive strategies of firms 
(Relations with suppliers and other firms) 
Attributes 
No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 
(% of firms ) (*) 
31-50 50-100 
Input purchases: 107 
Lower price 83 75 66 71 88 
Technical specifications 54 50 59 79 75 
Durability n.s. 33 33 n.s. 33 
Input suppliers: 106 
Preference for 
lowest number of 
suppliers 37 67 50 79 44 
Joint R&D programmes n.s. 58 n.s. 50 n.s. 
Joint product 
development 43 75 50 86 44 
Information about 
product quality 63 92 73 93 56 
Stable commercial links 38 75 77 79 78 
Suppliers certified 
by the firm 40 67 53 71 56 
Suppliers offering the 
most advantageous 
conditions 53 33 37 36 44 
Links with other firms 105 
Association for 
specific projects n.s. 50 52 71 70 
No strategy 55 33 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Source: See text n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(*) Firms were asked to indicate each attribute as "important" or "very 
important", and could indicate up to two atributes. Figures show the 
percentage of firms in each case. 
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All firms (rationally enough) prefer to buy inputs at low 
prices. It is, however, interesting to note that concern with the 
technical specifications of the inputs - although significant for 
all groups of firms - is an attribute far more important for the 
largest exporters, and might be a reflection of the more demanding 
external market., However, this is not so in the case of durability. 
Firms in general prefer to deal with a limited number of 
suppliers, and the exporters in particular attach importance to 
stable, long-term commercial links with their suppliers. Most firms 
care about product quality and say they exchange information about 
it with their input suppliers. But while domestic-market-oriented 
firms often consider buying from suppliers that offer the most 
advantageous conditions, it would seem from the figures in table 3 
that exporters tend to prefer those suppliers certified by the 
firm, and often carry out joint product development programmes. 
Furthermore, exporters tend to strategically associate with 
other firms for developing specific projects, while most domestic-
market-oriented firms say they have no strategy in that regard. 
This might be an additional indicator of the more exacting 
demands and greater stability of the rules required (and barriers 
imposed) by the external market as compared to domestic sales. 
Additional evidence of the firms' approach to modernization 
and to dealing with specific market segments is found in their 
investment strategy. 
As shown in table 4, a significant share of the firms 
consulted said they intended to invest both in increasing capacity 
and (more intensively) in modernizing productive capacity. The 
figures also reflect an intention to produce new items that are 
technologically similar to the present production lines. This is 
particularly characteristic of those firms with higher export/sales 
ratios, who aim also at explicitly specializing their product 
lines. 
One interpretation of these responses seems to be that 
exporters are in general more sensitive to the requirements and 
demands of the external market, and although there is a general 
trend towards modernizing production processes, common to most of 
the firms surveyed, the evidence is stronger for the firms with 
greater involvement in the external market. 
Differences are also found in the way firms finance their 
investment, although at this level of analysis not much can be said 
about the extent to which the differences are due to the 
export/sales ratios or to the size of firms. 
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Table 4 - Competitive strategies of firms 
(Investment policy and determinants of current strategy) 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 




Increase capacity in 
current lines 54 33 74 38 50 
Modernization without 
capacity variation 42 67 58 56 70 
New products tech. 
similar to current 
production 41 33 45 56 60 
Specialize 
product line n.s. 58 36 38 40 
Financing: 179 
Own resources 79 87 73 71 n.s. 
Public credit n.s. 40 43 71 70 
Domestic private 
financing n.s. 47 35 53 n.s. 
External private 
financing n.s. n.s. 38 65 60 
Localization: 110 
Present location 88 75 71 88 100 
Latin American 
countries (non-
MERCOSUR) n.s. 50 50 n.s. n.s. 
Determinants of 
present strategy 176 
Domestic recession 78 87 85 71 40 
Import competition n.s. n.s. n.s. 47 n.s. 
Market globalization n.s. 73 46 59 60 
MERCOSUR n.s. 47 n.s. 65 n.s. 
Consumers requirements 54 40 77 71 90 
Source: See text n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(*) Firms were asked to indicate each attribute as "important" or "very 
important", and could indicate up to two attributes. Figures show the 
percentage of firms in each case. 
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The figures in table 4 suggest that the lower the export/sales 
ratio (or the smaller the firm) , the more it depends on its own 
resources for financing investment. In fact, it is worth noting 
that about 80% of the domestic-market-oriented firms and small 
exporters depend on their own resources, while less than one third 
of the largest exporters do so. Instead, the figures indicate an 
increasing reliance on public credit and (as expected) external 
private financing that is directly proportional to the firms' 
grouping according to export/sales ratio. Note, furthermore, that 
the largest exporters rely almost exclusively on public credit and 
external private financing: the last column shows little (or no) 
indication of using the firms's own resources or domestic private 
credit. 
Not surprisingly, by and large the firms intend to maintain 
their productive units in their present location, but half of those 
firms with export/sales ratios of 6% to 30% (small to average 
exporters) say they plan to invest in other Latin American 
countries, out of the MERCOSUR area. This last figure calls for a 
cautious interpretation, for it might comprise capital movements 
into some of the region's tax heavens. 
A final set of indicators that seem to confirm previous 
conclusions has to do with the factors that have actually 
determined the present strategy adopted by the firms. 
As shown at the end of table 4, and as might have been 
expected in view of previous indicators, domestic recession did 
affect all groups of firms, but especially those that depend most 
on the domestic market. Import competition, on the other hand, is 
generally not considered as important, except for some medium to 
large-scale exporters. 
Market globalization is particularly relevant for most 
exporters, and all groups of firms - mainly the largest exporters -
care increasingly about consumer requirements. 
Interestingly enough, these figures suggest that MERCOSUR 
has become an important factor for some firms, but that only for 
those groups of firms with export/sales ratios of 6% to 50% - that 
is, small to medium exporters - does the subregional market matter, 
for the definition of both their competitive strategies and their 
investment policies. 
c. Productive performance 
The evidence presented so far has shown the increasing 
preoccupation of firms with consumer requirements, technical 
specifications of inputs and products, more efficient use of inputs 
and raw materials and other indicators, all pointing in the same 
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direction of increased competitiveness. 
A similar movement can be identified in the changes that have 
taken place in recent years in the production process. 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 show some basic indicators of the adaptation 
of the production process to the competitive strategy adopted by 
the firms. 
There is an overall tendency to reduce the average production 
time. Between 1987-1989 and 1992 there has been an increase in the 
number of firms with production time of less than 10 days, coupled 
with a simultaneous reduction of the percentage of firms with a 
production cycle of more than 30 days. A similar movement is 
observed in the percentage of firms that have reduced their average 
delivery time. 
The indicators relative to the average rate of reprocessing 
and the average rate of defective units out of total production 
also show a general reduction - between the two periods - in the 
percentage of firms in which more than 10% of output has 
imperfections. 
It is, however, worth noting that half of the group of largest 
exporters had a zero rate of reprocessing in both periods, which 
might indicate a pre-existing concern with efficiency not found in 
other firms. On the other hand, this same group shows an increase 
in the percentage of firms with a rate of defective units/total 
output of over 10% between periods, which calls for further, 
detailed analysis. 
There is a marked reduction in the average rate of input 
rejection in all groups of firms between 1987-1989 and 1992 -
especially among the smaller exporters and domestic-market-oriented 
firms - which confirms the concern about making better use of 
inputs, but could also reflect a policy of reducing costs. 
The argument that such changes are in fact related to 
movements linked to competitiveness is based on indicators that 
show a general reduction in the rate of returned products/total and 
a corresponding increase in the efficiency rate of raw material 
consumption, which would reflect more efficiency in the production 
process11. 
This is additionally confirmed by a set of data which indicate 
that in comparison with 1987-1989, 1992 product prices and 
"Note that this does not allow one to test the hypothesis 
advanced by Kirim (1990) that exporters and non-exporters rank 
differently their efforts with regard to cost reduction and 
quality improvement. 
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production costs were relatively lower, firms paid higher wages, 
brand-name acceptance in the market was similar or higher, firms 
(mainly exporters) took less time to deliver products, provided 
relatively more technical assistance, and produced items with 
higher technological sophistication, closer to technical 
specifications, with the same durability and increasingly better 
adapted to clients' specifications. 
The possibly negative counterpart of these positive movements 
is the indication that firms in general increased the share of 
energy consumption in total costs; this is particularly clear among 
the largest exporters. But as the question refers to costs, it does 
not clarify whether this is due to higher energy prices or to 
actual consumption. 
When asked how they view their main competitors (table 8) , the 
firms' overall reaction seems consistent with previous evidence, as 
it reflects a movement towards increased brand-name acceptance in 
the market, less time required for product delivery, more efficient 
provision of technical assistance, etc. The only aspect that is 
worth noting is the difference between exporters and domestic-
market-oriented firms in that the latter tend to reflect the 
inflationary domestic environment, considering product prices and 
wages higher in 1992 than five years earlier. 
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Table 5 - Competitive strategies of firms 
(Productive performance) 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
Firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 
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Source: See text 
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Table 6 - Competitive strategies of firms 
(Productive performance) 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 
( % of firms ) 
31-50 50-100 
Average rate of 
input rejection 101 
In 1987-1989 

























Average rate of 
returned products/ 
total sales 169 
In 1987-1989 

























Energy costs / 
direct costs 169 
In 1987-89 




























Rate of efficiency of raw 
material consumption 
(nominal/ 
effective rate) 101 
In 1987-1989 


























Source: See text 
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Table 7 - Competitive strategies of firms 
(1992 compared to 1987-1989) 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 
( % of firms ) (*) 
31-50 50-100 
Product price 158 
Lower 46 73 72 64 57 
Production costs 158 
Lower 28 67 53 64 71 











Market Acceptance of 












for delivery 154 
Less 40 67 63 50 71 
Time for developing 
new products 135 
Less 33 67 67 50 67 
Efficiency in 
technical assistance 136 
Higher 46 67 54 83 67 
Technological 
sophistication 137 
Higher 46 53 48 69 67 












Product durability 129 
Similar 57 79 55 56 \ 80 
Conformity to clients' 
specifications 137 
Higher 55 46 71 50 86 
Source: See text n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(*) Firms were asked to indicate each attribute as "important" or "very 
important", and could indicate up to two attributes. Figures show the 
percentage of firms in each case. 
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Table 8 - Competitive strategies of firms - View of the main competitor 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 
( % of firms ) (*) 
31-50 50-100 
Product price 152 
Similar 40 43 37 50 71 
Production costs 151 
Higher n.s. 36 n.s. 36 71 











Market acceptance of 












for delivery 150 
Similar 46 57 n.s. 43 57 
Time for developing 
new products 138 
Similar n.s. n.s. n.s. 43 57 
Efficiency in 













Higher n.s. 53 42 n.s. n.s. 
Conformity to technical 
specifications 141 
Similar 49 50 46 64 43 
Product durability 129 
Similar 51 69 48 78 60 












Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(-) Firms were asked to indicate each attribute as "important" or "very 
important", and could indicate up to two attributes, figures show the 
percentage of firms in each case. 
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d. Managerial, technological and productive capability 
Evidence surveyed at the beginning of this study indicates 
that the approach of exporters to expenditures on technology, 
technical assistance, etc. differs from that of domestic-market-
oriented firms. The information obtained from the present sample of 
firms tends to confirm this discrepancy. 
Table 9 summarizes a number of such indicators, relative to 
1987-1989 and 1992. 
It is interesting to note, first of all, that about half of 
the non-exporters spent nothing at all on research and development 
(R&D) in both periods, whereas a similar proportion of the group of 
largest exporters spend over 4.5% of their total sales in this 
activity. This obviously confirms expectations based on the 
analysis of broader samples (Braga (1990), Braga/Willmore (1991)) 
mentioned at the beginning of' this article. There are, however, 
indications that there has been a reduction in this item in 1992 in 
comparison to the previous period, probably owing to the overall 
cost-cutting policy. 
A similar relation is also found with regard to expenditures 
on engineering, sales, technical assistance and manpower training 
programmes - exporters spend relatively more on these items - and 
here again the indicators show a general reduction between the two 
periods. 
The differences between exporters and domestic-market-oriented 
firms are even sharper with regard to activities associated with 
the monitoring of the technological standard of production. Table 
10 shows some relevant indicators. 
As Kirim (1990) found in Turkey, it appears from the figures 
in table 10 that most services such as projects, product tests, 
certificates of compliance with technical requirements and 
consultancy services in marketing, management and quality are 
acquired in the domestic market, and that there is a concentration 
of affirmative answers in the group of largest exporters. No 
significant number of non-exporters said they had purchased those 
services either domestically or abroad. 
Typically, the types of services purchased abroad are 
associated with product specificities, and consist of tests, 
certificates of compliance with technical specifications and 
consultancy services on product quality. This is consistent with 
the previous reasoning that large exporters are subject to fierce 
consumer pressures and competitive efforts. 
However, the lack of indicators showing the purchase of 
technological services by non-exporters does not indicate a lack of 
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concern with quality. The evidence presented above - on more 
efficient technical assistance and closer conformity to technical 
and client specifications, among others - clearly suggests an 
increasing preoccupation with quality improvement. What the 
figures at the beginning of table 10 seem to show is that, first, 
even domestic-market-oriented firms have not been significantly 
affected by competition from imports (as indicated in table 4, 
import competition is not an important issue for the design of the 
firms' strategies), and second, that (as Kirim (1990) found in 
Turkey) these firms are more likely to acquire technologies mainly 
from informal sources in the domestic market. 
This is partially confirmed by the figures in Table 11. When 
asked about the origin of the technical norms they use, firms 
indicated a predominance of their own criteria for raw material 
handling, machinery operation and product standardization. 
Domestic-market-oriented firms rely on official norms for input 
qualification, product specifications, standardization and tests, 
while large exporters also use international norms for product 
specifications and tests. 
Another important fact indicated in table 10 is that in spite 
of the continued period of economic recession in Brazil, most firms 
in all groups - but mainly exporters - feel that their products 
compare very favourably (last or penultimate generation) with those 
produced by the main world exporters. 
Furthermore, productive capacity is also said to compare 
positively: between 4 0% and 70% of the firms indicate that their 
most important equipment is less than 10 years old and belongs to 
the last or penultimate technological generation. Domestic-market-
oriented firms - harder hit by domestic recession - cpmpared less 
favourably, as illustrated by the lower proportion of answers, but 
it is nevertheless remarkable that the corresponding indicators for 
this group of firms are in the 40%-50% range. 
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Table 9 - Competitive strategies of firms 
(Managerial, technological and productive capability) 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 
( % of firms ) 
31-50 50-100 
R&D expenditures/ 
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Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
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Table 10 - Productive capability and technological standards 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 31-50 50-100 
(a) ( % of firms ) 
Services acquired in 1991-1992 
a) In the domestic market 
Projects n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 50 
Tests n.s. n.s. n.s. 36 63 
Metrology n.s. 40 n.s. n.s. 50 
Certificate of compliance n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 50 
with technical specifications 
Consultancy in marketing n.s. n.s. n.s. 36 38 
Consultancy in management n.s. n.s. n.s. 71 75 
Consultancy in quality n.s. 40 n.s. 50 88 
b) Abroad 
Tests n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 50 
Certificate of compliance n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 38 
with technical specifications 
Consultancy in quality n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.. 38 
Generation of the main products of the firm 
Compared to the technological standard of the main world exporters 
Last or penultimate 41 73 67 71 75 
Age of the most important equipment ! 
Up to 10 Years 49 67 47 n.s. 37 
Technological generation of the most important equipment 
Last or penultimate 41 60 64 69 63 
Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(a) 169 respondents 
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Table 11 - Origin of technical norms used by firms 
Attributes Export/sales (%) ratio 
0-5 6-10 11-30 















Raw materials handling 
Firms'own criteria 57 40 50 50 100 
Machinery operation 















































Domestic (ABNT/INMETRO) 69 67 69 50 50 
Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
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e. Technological capability 
The counterpart of the movement towards more efficient 
production, quality improvement and higher product competitiveness 
is the need to adopt a number of measures related to the automation 
of production, the control of the production process, human 
resources policies and other factors. Tables 12 to 15 provide an 
overview of the main related points identified in the answers to 
the questionnaire, comparing the evolution between 1987-1989 and 
1992 to the firms' plans for 1993-1995. 
There was a clear increase in the number of firms using 
microelectronic devices in their main productive unit between 1987-
1989 and 1992. These are mostly medium to large exporters, and the 
indications are that these groups of firms intend to intensify the 
utilization of these devices in the next two years. 
An interesting difference between exporters and DMO firms is 
found in their approach to the ISO 9 000 regulations. Over half of 
the non-exporters said they either didn't know or didn't think it 
was relevant to implement those regulations12, while half or more 
of the exporters were already implementing them. This is consistent 
with the expectation that exporters are subject to more strict 
market rules and barriers. 
Also consistent with the previous pieces of evidence pointing 
to an increasing concern with quality and efficiency are the clear 
indications in every group of firms of a recent increase in the 
adoption of statistical control of production processes, the use of 
quality control circles, time-and-motion analyses, production 
cells, inbound just-in-time, outbound just-in-time, quality 
assurance activities at all stages of production, quality control 
activities at all stages of production, and quality assurance and 
control activities for all inputs. The indications are that the use 
of these mechanisms is likely to intensify in 1993-1995. 
The indicators are in general more intense in direct 
proportion to the export/sales ratios of the firms, and this (once 
more) confirms the increasing concern with quality improvement and 
cost reduction13. 
12However, another 39% of them said that they were already 
implementing them. > 
13However, not much can be said about the ranking of - these 
technological change activities as to the relative importance which 
exporters attach to them. 
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Table 12 - Automation, process control 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 
(a) 
0-5 6-10 11-30 
( % of firms ) 
31-50 50-100 
% Operations by microelectronic devices 
In 1987-1989 
Over 20% n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
In 1992 
Over 20% n.s. n.s. 33 46 71 
Projected 1993-1995 
Over 20% n.s. n.s. 56 66 67 
With regard to ISO 9000 regulations 
Don't know or don't want 
Being implemented 
Already implemented 
54 n.s. n.s. 
39 53 51 







Statistical control of 
Production process 
In 1987-1989 
Over 20% n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
In 1992 
Over 20% n.s. 42 41 n.s. n.s. 
Projected 1993-1995 
Over 20% 44 44 64 69 71 
Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(a) 169 respondents 
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Table 13 - Organizational procedures 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 
( % of firms ) 
31-50 50-100 
Quality control circles 165 
(Over 20% of workers 
involved in this activity) 
1987-1989 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1992 n.s. n.s. 36 n.s. n.s. 
Projected 1993-1995 34 n.s. 66 38 50 
Time-and-motion 
analysis (number (%) 
of operations) 141 
1987-1989 n.s. 42 n.s. 36 33 
1992 n.s. 42 52 54 33 
Projected 1993-1995 38 56 65 50 33 
Production cells 
(Over 20% of workers 140 
involved in this activity) 
1987-1989 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1992 n.s. 42 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Projected 1993-1995 n.s. 44 33 33 n.s. 
Inbound just in time 143 
(over 20% of workers 
involved in this activity) 
1987-1989 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1992 n.s. 33 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Projected 1993-1995 47 67 56 n.s. n.s. 
Outbound just in time 143 
(Over 20% of suppliers 
involved in this activity) 
1987-1989 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1992 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Projected 1993-1995 n.s. 44 42 46 n.s. 
Participation in just in time 
of clients 140 
(over 20% of shipments) 
1987-1989 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1992 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Projected 1993-1995 n.s. 44 38 n.s. n.s. 
Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
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Table 14 - Quality control procedures 
Attributes No. of Export/sales (%) ratio 
firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 
( % of firms ) 
31-50 50-100 
Quality assurance 
activities (all stages 
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Source: see text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
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Table 15 - Human resources policy 
Attributes No. Export/sales (%) ratio 
of firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 
( % of firms ) 
31-50 50-100 
Stable contracts 175 
with no formal guarantees 45 87 70 71 90 
Flexibility in broadly 
defining jobs 177 45 53 56 71 70 
Training policy: 177 
External institutions 39 47 65 65 50 
Systematic internal 
programmes n.s. 73 78 88 100 
Non-systematic internal 
programmes 42 33 38 n.s. 50 
Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
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Tables 1 and 2 have shown that this movement towards more 
efficient production had a corresponding adverse effect on 
employment, as firms began outsourcing basic services, among other 
measures. The figures in table 15 confirm that all groups of firms 
- but especially the larger exporters ••• have adopted as a strategy 
the practice of making stable job contracts with no formal 
guarantees, and also use flexibility in broadly defining jobs. 
At the same time, however, most firms - again, predominantly 
exporters - have training programmes (systematically or not) and 
rely mostly on external institutions to carry them out. Optimistic 
conclusions should be qualified, however, by the indications (table 
9) of a reduction in training programmes/total sales ratios between 
1987-1989 and 1992. 
f. "External" determinants of competitiveness 
A final set of data appears in tables 16 to 21. Firms were 
asked to isolate which - in their view - were the main determinants 
of competitiveness, with regard to market characteristics, 
industrial organization, relations with suppliers and 
characteristics of raw materials, attributes of equipment, 
macroeconomic conditions and international elements. 
The questions sought to ascertain how entrepreneurs considered 
each attribute with regard to its importance for the 
competitiveness of their firms in the market where they compete, as 
well as its influence on the firm itself. Furthermore, the 
questions on the effects on the firm referred to the present 
situation (as of 1992), so that for a given attribute, such as 
"conformity with client specifications", firms would say whether 
they considered it important for competing and whether the present 
degree of conformity had an identifiable positive or negative 
impact on the firm. 
In relation to market characteristics, in general the firms in 
all groups (not surprisingly) considered as important or very 
important for competing all of the attributes listed in the 
questionnaire - low sales prices, knowledge of product brand name, 
fast product delivery, fast development of new products14, 
efficiency in technical assistance, technical sophistication of 
products, conformity with client specifications, exploring specific 
market segments, and the possibility of exploring a large domestic 
market. 
"Apparently this was the only atribute more important for 
small to medium exporters. The answers given by all the others were 
positively correlated with the export/sales ratio. 
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Table 16 - Determinants of Competitiveness as Identified by the Firms 
(Market Characteristics) 
Attributes No. Export/sales (%) ratio 
of firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 31-50 50-100 
(a) ( % of firms ) 
Low sales price 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 88 100 94 100 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 48 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Product brand name 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 88 92 90 79 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 64 47 51 n.s. n.s. 
Fast product delivery 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 95 100 94 94 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 55 47 49 53 60 
Fast development of new products 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 54 92 81 81 60 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Efficiency in technical assistance 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 71 92 77 94 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 37 40 49 40 40 
Technical sophistication of products 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 71 75 84 75 60 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Conformity with technical specifications 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 80 83 94 94 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 39 40 62 59 90 
Conformity with client specifications 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 73 92 94 94 90 
For the firm: 
Positive 46 40 62 47 70 
Specific market segments 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 76 100 84 75 100 
For the Firm: 
Positive 51 47 56 n.s. 40 
Large domestic market 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 90 100 97 100 40 
For the Firm: 
Positive 46 40 53 47 n.s. 
Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(a) 176 respondents 
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Table 17 - Determinants of competitiveness as identified by the firms 
(Industrial organization) 
Attributes No. Export/sales (%) ratio 
of firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 31-50 50-100 
(a) ( % of firms ) 
Deverticalization of production 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 72 75 50 75 80 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. n.s. 37 n.s. 
Market diversification 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 55 67 70 94 80 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. n.s. 44 50 
Large-scale production 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 85 75 78 94 100 
For the Firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 80 
Source: See text. n.s. - pon-significant (less than 33%) 
(a) 176 respondents 
39 
Table 18 - Determinants ot competitiveness as identified by the firms 
(tntersectoral Relations - Suppliers and Raw Material) 
Attributes No. Export/sales (%) ratio 
of firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 31-50 50-100 
(a) ( % of firms ) 
Long, stable relations with suppliers 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 95 100 97 100 100 
For the Firm: 
Positive 76 53 74 53 70 
Long, stable relations with clients 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 100 100 97 100 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 85 73 92 82 100 
Keeping own distribution systems 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 68 58 63 50 70 
For the firm: 
Positive 42 n.s. n.s. n.s. 44 
Access to other distribution systems 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 61 33 66 81 90 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Low price for raw materials 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 98 92 97 100 80 
For the firm: 
Positive 50 n.s. 45 53 70 
Rapid access to raw materials 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important too 100 93 100 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 48 33 47 41 60 
Technical appropriateness of raw materials 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 95 100 97 100 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 55 n.s. 58 47 70 
Durability of raw materials 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 61 83 70 75 70 
For the firm: 
Positive 52 40 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Raw materials corresponding to the firm's Specifications 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 85 100 93 94 100 
For the Firm: 
Positive 43 n.s. 41 n.s. 40 
Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(a) 172 respondents 
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Table 19 - Determinants of competitiveness as identified by the firms 
(Intersectoral relations - equipment) 
Attributes No. Export/sales (%) ratio 
of firms 
(a) 
0-5 6-10 11-30 
( % of firms ) 
31-50 50-100 
Low price of equipment 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 83 92 90 94 100 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Rapid equipment elivery 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 73 100 87 100 100 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Efficient technical assistance for equipment 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 83 100 93 100 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 35 n.s. n.s. 41 50 
Technical sophistication of equipment 
Sectorally: 
Important or very mportant 78 99 93 94 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 41 n.s. 47 41 n.s. 
Conformity of equipment to technical specifications 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 89 100 83 94 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 35 n.s. 45 35 44 
Durability of equipment 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 90 100 97 100 100 
For the firm: 
Positive 48 n.s. 47 47 60 
Opportunities to import raw materials or components 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 83 82 93 100 80 
For the firm: 
Positive 35 n.s. 40 35 60 
Opportunities to import equipment 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 73 100 90 100 90 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. 40 35 60 
Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(a) 172 respondents 
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Table 20 - Determinants of competitiveness as identified by the firms 
(Intersectoral Relations - macroeconomic conditions) 
Attributes No. Export/sales (%) ratio 
of firms 
(a) 
0-5 6-10 11-30 




Important or very important 88 100 97 94 60 
For the firm: 
Negative 48 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Interest rate 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 100 100 100 100 90 
For the firm: 
Negative 79 53 82 94 70 
Exchange rate 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 70 100 87 94 90 
For the firm: 
Negative 35 33 44 n.s. n.s. 
Long-term credit 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 88 92 97 94 90 
For the firm: 
Negative 47 40 61 94 50 
Short-term credit 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 78 92 87 94 90 
For the firm: 
Negative 45 40 n.s. 41 n.s. 
Export financing 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 53 100 97 100 90 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 50 
Tax on inputs 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 98 100 93 100 90 
For the firm: 
Negative 82 67 71 77 70 
Tax on products 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 100 100 93 100 90 
For the firm: 
Negative 85 67 73 71 70 
Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(a) 172 respondents 
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Table 20 (cont.) - Determinants of competitiveness as identified by the firms 
(Intersectoral relations - Macroeconomic conditions) 
Attributes No. Export/sales (%) ratio 
of firms 0-5 6-10 11-30 31-50 50-100 
(a) ( % of firms ) 
Fiscal incentives to exports 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 63 100 90 94 90 
For the firm: 
Negative n.s. 40 42 n.s. n.s. 
Fiscal incentives to investment 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 75 100 100 88 90 
For the firm: 
Negative n.s. 60 63 47 40 
Import tariffs on inputs 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 70 100 93 94 70 
For the firm: 
Negative 36 33 53 59 n.s. 
Import tariffs on capital goods 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 55 92 89 94 80 
For the firm: 
Negative n.s. n.s. 58 47 n.s. 
Import tariffs on competing goods 
Sectorally: 
Important or very important 53 92 58 50 n.s. 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. 33 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Social security costs 
Sectorally: 
Important or very mportant 98 92 100 100 90 
For the firm: 
Negative 76 53 87 71 n.s. 
Source: See text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(a) 175 respondents 
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Table 21 - Determinants of competitiveness as identified by the firms 
(Intersectoral relations - international conditions) 
Attributes No. Export/sales (%) ratio 
of firms 
(a) 
0-5 6-10 11-30 
( % of firms ) 
31-50 50-100 
Access to new foreign technologies 
Sectorally: 
Very important n.s. 67 63 81 60 
For the firm: 
Positive 34 47 34 n.s. 40 
Technological links with foreign firms abroad 
Sectorally: 
Very important n.s. 50 47 69 n.s. 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. 47 33 n.s. n.s. 
Harmonization of trade policies 
Sectorally: 
Very important n.s. 50 53 44 50 
For the firm: 
Negative n.s. n.s. 41 44 n.s. 
MERCOSUR 
Sectorally: 
Very important n.s. n.s. 47 38 n.s. 
For the firm: 
Positive n.s. n.s. 34 41 n.s. 
Tariff barriers to international trade 
Sectorally: 
Very important n.s. 33 47 75 100 
For the firm: 
Negative n.s. n.s. n.s. 71 56 
Technical barriers to international trade 
Sectorally: 
Very important n.s. n.s. n.s. 63 80 
For the firm: 
Negative n.s. n.s. n.s. 47 60 
Source: see text. n.s. - non-significant (less than 33%) 
(a) 111 respondents 
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Also, there is no significant indication that any of these 
attributes would at present have negative effects on the firms. 
Instead, most of the firms in all groups were satisfied (positive 
influence) with the present status of product delivery time, 
efficiency in providing technical assistance, and conformity with 
technical and client product specifications. 
As far as the attributes of industrial organization are 
concerned, most firms - regardless of their export/sales ratio -
consider important or very important the deverticalization of 
production, market diversification and large-scale production. Only 
some of the larger exporters, however, indicated that the present 
situation has positive effects on their firms. 
Firms of all groups also praise - as determinants of 
competitiveness - the maintenance of long and stable relations with 
suppliers and clients and the possibility of gaining rapid access 
to raw materials that are also cheap and technically appropriate 
and that correspond to the firm's specifications. Apparently they 
are less worried15 about the distribution system for their 
products, be it exclusive or belonging to third parties. 
Thus, entrepreneurs have in general indicated positive effects 
on their firms stemming from the present status of their relations 
with suppliers and clients and rapid access to raw materials. 
A very high proportion (nearly all) of the firms in all groups 
consider (not surprisingly) as very important for competitiveness 
rapid access to cheap, durable, technically sophisticated equipment 
with efficient technical assistance and conformity to technical 
specifications. Also very important are opportunities to import 
equipment and raw materials and components. 
No significant proportion of firms manifested satisfaction 
with the present situation with regard to the price or delivery 
time for acquiring new equipment. A sizeable share (about 40% or 
more) of the entrepreneurs consider positive for their firms the 
present level of technical sophistication and durability of the 
equipment16, but apparently only the exporters seem satisfied with 
current terms for importing equipment and raw materials17. 
"However, they still consider it important or very important 
for competing in the market. 
16In accordance with the evidence provided by table 10, which 
suggests a relative technological updating of the most important 
equipment in most firms. 
17This is consistent with the indications (table 1) that only 
these firms have imported significantly in recent years. 
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In their appraisal of the macroeconomic determinants of 
competitiveness, the firms are almost unanimous in naming the level 
of domestic interest rates, the level of taxation of production and 
social security costs as very important items. Other relevant 
variables are (as expected) the exchange rate, labour costs, the 
availability of short- and long-term credit and fiscal incentives 
for exports and for investment in general. 
It is particularly remarkable that import tariffs on competing 
goods apparently rank last in importance, considering the 
percentage of firms that classified it as important. One group of 
firms even indicated that this attribute had positive effects.18. 
The figures in table 20 reflect more explicitly the 
dissatisfaction of entrepreneurs with some of the most obvious 
effects of inflation in a context of fiscal deficit: a large number 
of firms noted the negative impacts of high interest rates, the 
limited availability of long-term credit, the relatively high tax 
on inputs and products and (for all but the largest exporters) the 
level of import tariffs on inputs and social security costs. 
The first and last sets of indicators in table 20, taken 
together, indicate that labour costs seem relevant mainly for 
domestic-market-oriented firms, while social security costs affect 
most groups of firms. The corresponding (non-significant) 
indicators for the group of largest exporters might be interpreted 
as a suggestion that the relatively higher intensity of the 
adjustment that took place in this group (table 1) has made these 
firms less sensitive to factor costs. 
A final set of determinants of competitiveness external to the 
firms concerns some key factors in international relations. It is 
worth noting, first of all, not only that a smaller number of firms 
answered this part of the questionnaire, but also that the 
percentages in each row of table 21 are smaller than in table 20. 
This reflects the obvious fact that firms are, on the whole, more 
concerned about domestic constraints; only exporters care about 
these international determinants19. 
According to table 21, firms consider as very important for 
competing in their markets access to new foreign technologies -
either directly or via links with foreign firms - and mechanisms 
to avoid barriers that currently affect their exports. 
At the firm level, there are indications that the groups of 
18This is consistent with the previous indication that import 
competition is not relevant to the definition of production and 
marketing strategies. 
19The figures in the first column of table 21 apparently 
confirm that domestic-market-oriented firms are less interested. 
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medium to large-scale exporters are at present negatively affected 
by tariff and technical barriers to trade, and by the present 
harmonization of trade policies. 
This dissatisfaction with the present harmonization of trade 
policies does not refer to the consolidation of MERCOSUR. In fact, 
MERCOSUR is considered important by small- and medium-scale 
exporters (firms with an export/sales ratio of up to 50%) -as shown 
by the figures in table 4 - and these firms have indicated positive 
effects. 
V - General evaluation 
This study is a first attempt to identify - through a partial 
processing of the data obtained from a survey of industrial firms 
in Brazil in 1992 - the basic actions recently undertaken by those 
firms to improve their competitiveness, and to relate the 
differences among the firms to their involvement in exporting 
activity. 
It should be clear that the results obtained here have to be 
carefully considered in light of the specific (unusual) period when 
the firms were surveyed. That was a time when the domestic economy 
presented recessive conditions, coupled with record inflation and 
fiscal imbalance. It was also a period when the export sector was 
starting to recover from the effects of the highest exchange-rate 
overvaluation since the adoption of the crawling-peg mechanism in 
1968. 
From the perspective of the participation of domestic products 
in the international market, the toll taken by these adverse 
conditions was a significant fall - in the second half of the 
1980s -in the market share of Brazilian exports in most geographic 
areas20. In addition, some structural constraints have been of 
increasing concern to analysts of the Brazilian trade sector. Not 
only do natural resources-intensive products with low processing 
still represent an overwhelming share of the country's exports. A 
large proportion of the non-traditional products exported from 
Brazil have relatively less dynamic markets; at least in terms of 
demand in OECD countries, the prospects stemming from the structure 
of specialization seem to compare poorly with those of 
competitors21. 
In such a context - and given the peculiarities of the 
20For basic data, see BNDES (1993). 
21In this regard, see Fichet (1993). 
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questionnaire - this study should not be expected to constitute a 
comprehensive test of the role of exports. Instead, the purpose of 
this first approximation (not controlling for firm size or sectoral 
peculiarities) is to depict the efforts that have been made by the 
firms surveyed in order to foster competitiveness, and - whenever 
possible - to try to identify indications that involvement in the 
external market might lead to a differentiated approach. 
The analysis has shown an overall movement of most producers 
towards productive efficiency; an intensification of the use of 
quality criteria in purchasing inputs, using raw materials and 
managing the production process; a clear concern with product 
quality and the provision of technical assistance; and a 
preoccupation with meeting client-determined specifications, in 
specific market segments. 
The results also show that the sampled firms have, as a rule, 
gone through an adjustment process clearly motivated by the recent 
recessive inflationary conditions of the domestic market; among 
other consequences, this has led to lower labour/output ratios. 
The evidence surveyed here also tended to confirm in broad 
terms the results obtained elsewhere with regard to exporters being 
more concerned with formally (i.e., by means of market-mediated 
contracts) acquiring technology and adapting themselves to more 
strict market conditions than domestic-market-oriented firms. 
In the external side, the data indicate that the larger 
exporters are being affected by the barriers importing countries 
impose on their products. Additionally, there is evidence that 
MERCOSUR has become a factor taken into consideration by some firms 
in defining their strategies, although the largest exporters do not 
seem to be among them. 
The inferences one might derive from these indicators for 
suggesting policy measures should take into account, first, that 
they refer to a fairly representative set of firms, corresponding 
to 23% of the exports of industrial products in 1992. Also, one 
should keep in mind the fact that firms with the highest 
export/sales ratios are large in size, belong to economic groups 
and have diversified lines of production. This might be indicative 
of the importance of inter-industrial relations for the export 
sector22. 
This seems to be confirmed by the respondents'concern about 
maintaining stable commercial relations with suppliers and clients, 
as well as the preoccupation with meeting client specifications and 
providing technical assistance in specific market segments. 
22As indicated also in BNDES (1993). 
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An optimistic view of these indicators would suggest that this 
approach of "specialization leading to competitiveness" might have 
deeper roots in the productive structure than the simple analysis 
of the export structure would suggest. If so, this would also mean 
greater capacity to disseminate the benefits of exporting activity 
into the productive sector and lead to more systemic 
competitiveness. 
A pessimistic view would stress the fact that the external 
market actually served as a "cushion" against the domestic 
recession during the period of analysis, and hence export 
performance might be vulnerable to an upturn in economic activity. 
This could be confirmed by the indications that firms care most 
about the domestic market. 
The truth probably lies in between. As emphasized earlier, the 
period of analysis is unusual in that domestic recession influenced 
most of the outcomes, as reflected in the cost-cutting policies 
that led to reduced expenditures on engineering, sales, manpower 
training and other items. But at the same time, the figures 
presented here point to an increasing concern with the number of 
operations by microelectronic devices, with implementing the ISO 
9000 regulations and other factors, all of which would indicate a 
more systematic and careful approach to more demanding markets 
(firms do not seem to worry much about import competition), where 
firms feel as technologically updated as their competitors. 
One might add that these animal spirits of the export sector 
might be reinforced by previous experience: in 1986 a domestic boom 
induced several exporters to redirect their sales, only to learn 
very soon the costs of losing stable relations with foreign 
clients, a characteristic specifically praised in the answers to 
the present survey. 
It is hard to derive more definite conclusions from such a 
broad analysis, without going into details about the role of the 
firms' size and sectoral specificities. The sample comprises such 
diverse sectors as the production of power-generating machinery, 
furniture and apparel and clothing, among others, but the shortage 
of time for analysis does not allow for more detailed treatment of 
the information. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to know if there is any 
significant difference between foreign and domestically-owned firms 
(especially among the larger exporters) with regard to the 
variables considered here. Bielschowsky (1993) shows that the 
movement towards competitiveness has apparently been more intense 
in subsidiaries of foreign companies than in domestic firms, 
although the intensity of the changes in the latter are quite 
impressive. But his sample does not allow for the analysis of 
performance according to the export/sales ratio, as in the present 
study. That would require a further processing of the primary data. 
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The policy implications that follow from these sets of data 
are numerous. First, the firms surveyed show an overall confidence 
with regard to their conditions for competing with imports. This 
would indicate that (possibly with some specific sectoral 
exceptions) there seems to be, in general, no reason to reverse the 
policy of low import barriers. The evidence reviewed seems to 
recommend instead that international negotiators should intensify 
efforts to reduce the trade barriers affecting exports. 
The indications of concern with structural competitiveness 
might look inconsistent with the reduction of expenditure on 
related measures such as manpower training, if one does not take 
into account the short-term peculiarities of the period. It seems, 
however, that this inconsistency is unsustainable over time, and 
that firms will sooner or later be forced to resume these 
activities if they are to maintain or improve their level of 
competitiveness. But it is also an indicator that there is a case 
for complementary policy measures to help firms overcome the 
difficulties that led to that reduction. Such initiatives become 
even more important in a period of systematic and generalized 
reduction of employment/sales ratios. 
By and large, the firms surveyed point to the levels of 
domestic interest rates and of taxes on inputs and products as two 
major constraints they have to face. Needless to say, this affects 
all the firms, but it is interesting to note that the exporters 
have been able to gain access to cheaper foreign financing. When 
considered together with the indications that these firms belong to 
economic groups, these differentiated conditions might lead to 
considerations of the likely consequences for the domestic market 
structure. Measures to ensure fair competition might become even 
more necessary than before. 
The results presented here also suggest other types of 
policies more directly related to the quest for systemic 
competitiveness, such as informing a broader spectrum of firms of 
the importance of adopting mechanisms like those prescribed by the 
ISO 9000, providing credit and other incentives to help (mainly 
smaller) firms improve their managerial, technological and 
productive capability, and several other initiatives. 
The range of possibilities for policy suggestions is as varied 
as the topics covered by this report. It is hoped that this broad 
picture will prove helpful in identifying the main issues. More 
specific conclusions would require a more detailed analysis of the 
enormous amount of information available, at the sectoral level. 
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